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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest
of
MICHA.EL P.A.THICK KELSEY,
a person under the age of 18 years.

I
~

Case No.
10840

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 5th day of September, 1962, David L.
Kelsey was awarded a decree of divorce from his wife,
Teralee S. Kelsey. There were three children as issue
from said marriage, to wit: Kelly, age 4.; Michael, age
3; and Shannon, age 1 year. Custody of the children
was awarded to their mother, and the father was ordered
to pay the sum of $120 per month for their support,
which amount was paid regularly each month. Mrs.
Kelsey shortly afterwards moved with her children
from Salt Lake County to Provo in Utah County,
1

where she became mentally and psychologically ill.
During about December, 1962, a petition was filed
with the Juvenile Court of Utah County alleging that
said .minor children were being neglected by their
mother. A hearing on said petition was held before the
Juvenile Court on January 7th, 1963, at which time it
was found, that the mother of the children was afflicted
with mental and psychological problems which interf erred with her ability to render proper care of her
children so the court ordered that the children be placed
with the Ptah County Public Welfare Department
for foster care. The father of said children was at that
time unmarried and had no home in which he could
properly care for his children, so it was arranged for
him to pay to the Welfare Department the sum of
$120 per month for their support. The matter was then
set for review on January 6, 1964.
During the year of 1963, the father became married
and established a home in Salt Lake County and requested custody of his children. The Welfare Department investigated his home and family conditions and
found them to be satisfactory so custody of two of the
children, Kelly and Shannon, were awarded to him on
a trial basis, under the supervision of the Salt Lake
County Department of Public Welfare. On January
13, 1965 a valuation report in depth was requested by
the Judge of the Salt Lake County Welfare Department on the adjustment Kelly and Shannon were making in their father's home. The report showed that the
father was regularly employed and that the home con-
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ditions were satisfactory and the two children were doing well, so the court ruled that the children should
remain with their father but that "Michael remain in
foster care because of his own particular needs and the
desire of the Welfare Department to get Kelly and
Shannon well settled before returning Michael."
During this time Leonard Oldham and Pat.5y
Oldham, his wife, applied to the Utah County Welfare
Department for the foster care of a boy in their home.
On May 7, 1963, Michael was placed with them on a
foster care basis and they received from the department
regular monthly grants for his care from the money
being paid to the department by the respondent. The
Oldhams subsequently moved to the State of California,
taking Michael with them and on March 28, 1966, filed
a petition with the Juvenile Court of Utah County for
leave to adopt said child. The child's natural father,
the respondent herein, anticipating because of the order
of the court on January 13, 1965 that Michael would
join his brother and sister in his home as soon as they
were settled in it, objected to the granting of the petition for leave to adopt. A hearing was held thereon.
The court denied the petition and ordered that Michael be returned to his father. From that order the
petitioners appealed.
The child's natural father is happily married, is
regularly employed by Buehner Block Company, who
reports that he is a good workman, is buying a home
at 439 Front Street, Salt Lake City, is rearing two
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of his children in his home and is able and desirous
of having Michael join his brother and sister in his
home under his custody. 'Vith Michael living in California with faster parents he is completely cut off
from all contacts with his family.

ARGUMENT
In petitioning for leave to adopt Michael the appellants are in effect seeking to terminate the right
of the child's parents to his custody.
The first contention of respondent is that the statutory requirements for terminating the right of a natural
parent to custody of his children have not been met
in the instant case.
These requirements are summarized as follows:
a. A hearing must first be held "specifically on the
question of terminating the rights" of a parent to custody of his children before custody can be given to another with out the parents' consent. No such hearing
has been held in the instant case.
b. A parent must be found to be "an unfit or incompetent parent" at such a hearing before custody
can be taken from him against his will. No such finding
has been made as to respondent in the instant case.
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REQUIREMENT OF A HEARING
Section 55-10-109-(2) U.C.A. 1953 as amended,
specifically provides as follows:
(2) "A termination of parental rights may be
ordered only after a hearing is held on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings
must be taken and the parties must be advised
of their right to counsel. No such hearing shall
be held earlier than ten days after service of
summons is completed inside or outside of the
state. The summons must contain a statement
to the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated
in the proceedings. The statement may be made
in the summons originally issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued."

No such hearing has been held before any court
in the instant case and no such summons for such a
hearing has been served on respendent.
The only hearing involving the right of respondent
to the custody of his son, Michael, was the one on the
petition of appellants in the Juvenile Court of Utah
County for Leave to Adopt the child. At that hearing
no evidence was offered on the fitness or competency
of respondent to rear his son. In that hearing the court
rightly denied the Petition for Leave to Adopt and
entered the following decree:
1. That Michael Patrick Kelsey is hereby de-

clared to be within the continuing jurisdiction
of the Court.
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2. That in the best interest of Michael Patrick
Kelsey and subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court, the care, custody, control
and guidance of Michael Patrick Kelsey are
hereby awarded to the father, and the Department of Public Welfare and Leonard and
Patsy Oldham are he.reby directed to forthwith return Michael Patrick Kelsey to the
father under the supervision of the Salt Lake
County Welfare of Public Welfare.
3. This matter is set for review on August 21,
1967 at 2 :00 P.M. Dated this 11th day of
January, 1967."

It is the contention of respondent that the jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts over neglected and mistreated
children is purely a statutory authority and that the
procedures set up in the statutes must be followed in
detail in the exercise of such authority by the courts.
It, therefore, follows that in the absence of a hearing
in accordance with the provisions of Section 55-10-109(2) UCA, 1953, the respondent cannot be deprived of
custody of his child in the instant case.
PROOF OF FITNESS OF NATURAL PARENT
Section 55-10-109-( 1) UCA, 1953, as amended,
clearly states what must be proved at such a hearing
before a natural parent can be deprived of custody.
The court must find that the natural parent is either
a. Unfit or incompetent "by reason of conduct
or conditions seriously detrimental to the child,
or
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b. That the parent has abandoned his child, or
c. That the parent has continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give proper parental
care and protection during a trial period with
the child in his home on probation.
Applying these circumstances to the instant case
we find the following:
a. Instead of being found to be an unfit or incompetent parent, the Welfare Department has repeatedly,
upon investigation, found respondent to be both fit
and competent to rear his children. The manner in
which he and his wife have been rearing two of his
three children has met with the approval of both the
Welfare Department and the Juvenile Court. He has
proved that his home, his wife and the environment
in his home are good and wholesome.
b. Respondent has never abondoned his child. He
has supported all of his children from the time of their
birth. Since the divorce when the children were awarded
to their mother, he has made regular payments of $40
per month to either his former wife or the Welfare
Department for each child. He has paid to appellants
through the Juvenile Court the cost of supporting
Michael during the years he has lived in their home as
a foster child, and his constantly sought custody of him.
c. Respondent has never had Michael in his home
on a trial basis, primarily because the boy has been
living in California with the appellants. The records
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show that he has succeeded in the rearing of the brother
and sister of Michael since he has had custody of them.
Respondent contends that none of the circumstances listed in the statutes as grounds for depriving
him of custody of his boy exist in the instant case. Instead he has proved to the satisfaction of the Juvenile
Court that he is a fit and competent parent who is able
and desirous of rearing Michael as well as his other
children.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The same legislative act which clothed Juvenile
Courts of Utah with the authority they now have clearly
states the legislative intent relating thereto. This is
stated in Section 55-10-63, UCA, 1953, as follows:

"Purpose of act - Construction. - It is the purpose of this act to secure for each child coming
before the juvenile court such care, guidance,
and control, preferable in his own home, as will
serve his welfare and the best interests of the
state; to preserve and strengthen family ties
whenever possible; to secure for any child who
is remoyed from his home the care, guidance, and
discipline required to assist him to develop into
a responsible citizen, to improve the conditions
and home environment responsible for his delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect the
community and its individual citizens against
juvenile violence and juvenile law breaking. To
this end this act shall be liberally construed."
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The meaning seems clear that the legislature intended by enacting this legislation that the juvenile
courts of the state try to accomplish the purpose of
the legislation by working with the parents and children within their home and to preserve the family
status if possible, and that children should not be removed from the home or from the custody of their
parents before it becomes apparent that the welfare
of the children require such action.
In the instant case, Michael has been deprived of
all association with his brother and sister and his parents, and no opportunity has been afforded respondent
to unite his family and to strengthen the natural ties
between his children and himself as the statute intended.

PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS O:F
NATURAL PARENTS
It is a well-settled doctrine in this state as well
as in other states that the natural parent of a child
has a preferential right of custody. Furthermore, in
Utah, there is a presumption that it will be to the
best interest of children for them to be reared by their
natural parents. On this point the Court stated the following in the case of In re Bradley, (Utah) 167 P 2d
978.p.984

"There is a presumption that it will be for
the best interest of the child to be reared by its
natural parent, and that presumption is not
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overcome until the trier of the facts is satisfied
from the evidence to the contrary. Such presumption being based on logic and natural inference should be kept in mind by the trier of
the facts and weighed and considered along with
the other evidence in determining what is for the
best interest of the child."

In re Johnson (Utah), 175 P2d 486, the Court
stated:
"Throughout the Juvenile Code repeated
warnings are given as to the preferential rights
of natural parents."
"The legal right of the parents, however,
should never be lost sight of as an influential
factor or lightly or arbitrarily disregarded, nor
should their moral, natural and emotional ties
with the child be overlooked; the law presumes
that the interest of the child will be best served
by awarding its custody to the parent, and in the
absence of conduct on their part or conditions
that render it essential to the safety and welfare
of the child in most serious and important respects, either physically, intellectually, or morally, that it should be removed from their custody,
the court should always give the custody to them,
and should ref use to give the custody to third
persons even though they are in all respects
suitable to have the custody of the child and able
to care for it, or even though they are better
able to afford the child material advantages." 17
C.J.S. 649 Para. 12.

In re State (Utah), 175 P2d 486, P 488,
"Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a presumption that it will
be for the best interest of the child to be reared
10

under the care, custody, control and supervision
of its natural parents. Such presumption is only
overcome when the trier of the facts is convinced
by the evidence that the welfare of the child requires that the child be awarded.to someone other
than the natural parents. Thus the ultimate burden of proof on this question is always in favor
of t~e natural parents and against other persons
seekmg custody of such child. In addition thereto, this presumption is based on logic, and experience shows generally that parents have more
love, devotion and regard for their own children
than do other people. Therefore, this fact has
evidentiary value which should be considered by
the trier of the facts in determinig such question."

Baldwin vs. Nielson, 170 P.2d 179, P. 181.
"There is a presumption in a contest between
a parent of the child on the one hand and a
person who is not the parent of the child on the
other hand, that it will be to the best interests
and welfare of the child to be reared under the
care, custody and control of its natural parents.
Under such presumption the burden of persuading the trier of the facts is always on the person
who claims that it will be for the best interest
of the child to be reared by someone other than
the natural parents of said child.''
Walton vs. Coffrnan, 169 P.2d 97, P. 103.
"In addition thereto, this presumption being
based on logic and natural inferences, should
be kept in mind by the trier of the f:licts and
weighed and considered with all of the other
evidence in determining this question. The common experience of mankind teaches that "blood
is thicker than water", that usually there is a
much stronger attachment between a natural
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parent and a child than is developed between the
child and a foster parent, that ordinarily the
natural parent is willmg to sacrifice its own
interests and welfare for the benefit of the child
much more than is the case with foster parents
and that generally the natural parent is more
sympathetic and understanding and better able
to get the confidence and love of its own child
than anyone else."
There being no evidence on the fitness of respondent as a parent and no hearing on such an issue, the
presumption stands that the best interest of Michael will be served by placing him in the custody of
his father.
THE llEST WELFARE OF THE CHILD
In their brief the appellants contended that Michael
was placed in a foster home because of the acts of its
natural parents; therefore, their rights as parents became subordinate to the best interests of the child, and
their claim for custody of their offspring became ineffective. If such a theory became the law of the land,
every parent during periods of temporary illness or
loss of employment could find himself in a position
of losing custody of his children.
In the instant case the children were not placed
in foster homes because of the acts of either parent.
The children had been awarded to their mother, who
was entitled by law to their custody in divorce proceedings. They were taken from her because she became
mentally and physically ill. The respondent has been
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trying to get custody of them since then. He has supported them from the date of the divorce. He has been
found by the Juvenile Court to be a fit person to have
custody. He has done nothing to disqualify himself
under the law from having such custody. The original
circumstances which resulted in the placement of the
children in foster care was not due to any misconduct
of their parents. Instead it was due to the mental and
physical illness of their mother, who had been awarded
custody of them in the divorce proceedings, and the
fact that at that particular time their father was not
established in a home where he could look out for them.
At the hearing before the juvenile court on their
Petition for Leave to Adopt Michael appellants avoided any evidence relating to the fitness of respondent to
have custody. Undoubtedly this was because of previous
findings that he was fit to rear his boy with its brother
and sister. A reading of the transcript reveals that they
attempted to prove that appellants were good people,
were providing Michael with a good home as foster
parents and were taking good care of him, that they
and their children loved him and wanted to adopt him,
that he was being treated as one of the family and not
as a foster child, and that Michael was happy in their
home.
Their witnesses consisted of the appellants, their
bishop and his wife, their stake president, who was a
doctor, a friend who was in the U. S. Air Force stationed in Turkey who had visited with appellants in
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their home several times. There was a stipulation that
the children of appellants who were present at the
hearing would testify that they loved Michael and
wanted to keep him in their home, if they were called
to testify.
It seems significant that the whole family came
to the hearing from California-all except Michaelwho was really the only one who could have revealed
the true facts as to whether he was happy in the home
of appellants, or wanted to be adopted by them instead
of being permitted to live with his father and brother
and sister. His absence casts a doubt as to whether he
is happy in his foster home.

The evidence showed that both ofthe appellants
were employed on a full-time basis at a State Mental
hospital. This fact raises the question as to whether
any child is better off in a home where both parents are
working than he would be in a home where the mother
does not work as is the situation in his natural father's
home.
None of the witnesses had close connections with
appellants' family except the members of the family.
The bishop stated that he had been in their home two
or three times. His wife had observed Michael every
other Tuesday in the school library, where she was a
voluntary worker, and at church. The stake president,
who was a physician, had seen him two or three times
as his doctor. All of the non-members of the family
apparently based their conclusions on casual observa-
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tions in church and other places. The one person,· Michael, who could have presented the best evidence as
to the effects on his life in living with his foster parents
was not brought forth to testify.

It was brought out at the hearing that Michael had

"wet his bed" at nights during the years he had lived
with appellants. Doctor Van W agonen, one of the appellants' witnesses, testified that in his opinion this
was due to emotional background rather than any
physical condition. He stated that in his opinion an
emotional upset resulting from moving him from his
home may increase his "bed wetting." In view of the
testimony of Venita Kelsey and Roland Kelsey, grandparents of Michael with whom he lived during about
four months immediately prior to his being placed in
a foster home, that Michael never wet the bed while
he lived with them, the question arises as to whether
the emotional circumstances which caused that condition were not the result of his experiences in his foster
home. One wonders also, why the bed wetting has continued over the three-year period he was in the home
of appellants if he was as happy and contented and
well adjusted as their testimony indicated.
But even if it were proved beyond question that
appellants were in all respects suitable to have custody
of Michael, and were able to care for him, or "even
though they are better able to afford the child material
advantages" than his natural parents could provide,
the court should give custody to his natural father in
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the absence of testimony that the natural parent is
unfit. See 17 C.J.S. 649, Para. 12, supra.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, respondent prays
that the decree of the Juvenile Court of Utah County
be affirmed, and that Michael be returned to the home
of his father, the respondent herein, and for costs.
Respectfully submitted,
Herbert B. Maw
310 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Respondent.
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